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Colonial and independent governments in twentieth-century Gold Coast/Ghana have
consistently viewed alcohol revenues as a major source ofgovernment income. The
importance of the alcohol industry refiects not only the skewed nature of the
Ghanaian economy, but also indicates the existence of a huge local demand for
alcohol. A vocal temperance group, whose activities date from the colonial period,
has sought to challenge and revise the state's dependence on alcohol revenues. To
explore the resulting dilemma, it is necessary to examine the cultural and historical
circumstances tkat elevated the economic significance of alcohol, the development
of the alcohol industry and its role in the country's economy, and the relations of
Ghanaian governments to the alcohol industry.
Au XX" siècle, les gouvernements coloniaux et indépendants de la Côte de l'Or ou
du Ghana ont toujours considéré les recettes générées par l'alcool comme l'une de
leurs principales sources de revenus. L'importance de l'industrie de l'alcool
démontre non seulement que l'économie du Ghana est biaisée, mais aussi l'exis-
tence d'une demande énorme à l'échelle locale. Un groupe de tempérance qui avait
une grande visibilité et dont les activités remontent à la période coloniale, a essayé
de contester et de modifier la dépendance de l'État par rapport aux revenus
générés par l'alcool. Afin d'examiner le dilemme, il faut étudier les circonstances
culturelles et historiques qui ont élevé l'importance économique de l'alcool, le
développement de l'industrie de l'alcool et son rôle dans l'économie du pays, de
même que la relation entre les gouvernements du Ghana et l'industrie de l'alcool.
COLONIAL AND INDEPENDENT governments in twentieth-century Gold
Coast/Ghana have both viewed alcohol revenues as an important source of
government finance. In the mercantile colonial economy, Gold Coast gov-
ernors linked customs duties on imported a1cohol to the ability to provide
the internaI infrastructure necessary for economic development. In the
underdeveloped Ghanaian economy, excise duties, sales taxes, and profit
* Emmanuel Akyeampong is an assistant professor of history at Harvard University. Research for this
work was performed under a Fellowship from the African Development Foundation.
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dividends paid by local breweries and distilleries to the state represent
indispensable sources of government income. Indeed, for post-independence
Ghanaian governments, the profitable breweries are seen as visible signs of
economic development.
The importance of the alcohol industry not only reflects the skewed
nature of the Ghanaian economy, but also indicates the existence of a huge
local demand for alcohol. A vocal temperance group, whose activities date
from the colonial period, has sought to challenge and revise the state's
dependence on alcohol revenues. Organized around churches and recently
medical practitioners, the temperance movement has emphasized that the
social costs of the alcohol industry outweigh its economic contribution. 1
This has resulted in sorne degree of ambivalence on the part of the state
towards liquor revenues. To explore this dilemma, it is necessary to examine
the cultural and historical circumstances that elevated the economic signifi-
cance of alcohol, the development of the alcohol industry and its role in the
Gold CoastlGhanaian economy, and the relations of Ghanaian governments
to alcohol revenues and the alcohol industry.
Alcohol, Sacred and Secular Power in Pre-Colonial Gold Coast
The world views of the Akan, Ga-Adangme, and Ewe peoples of southern
Gold Coast encompassed the living, the dead, and the unborn in a religious
structure in which interaction with ancestors and gods occupied a central
place in day-to-day existence.2 Communication with the spiritual wOrld was
essential in the pursuit of social goals, and alcohol (in the Twi language,
nsa) facilitated communication between the spiritual and physical worlds.3
Male eIders in southern Gold Coast societies viewed nsa as possessing
potent spiritual power because of its intoxicating quality; without nsa, one
could not communicate through libation (in Twi, nsa guo or mpae yi) with
the ancestors (nsamanfo) and the gods (abosom).4
Libation was central to rites of passage (in particular the observance of
funerals) and festivals, as the blessings of the ancestors were necessary for
the success of these ceremonies. Judicial processes and legal contracts
1 The Ghanaian branch of the International Couneil on Alcohol and Addictions, under the chairman-
ship of Dr. J. B. Asare, acts as an active temperance lobby in Ghana today.
2 Although the Gur-speaking peoples of the Northern Territories have used local beer (pifa brewed
from Guinea corn or millet) for centuries in ri tuai and social life, the area waS designated a
prohibition zone in 1890 by an international conference in Brussels. This restriction was confinned
by the 1919 St. Gennain international convention on Iiquor traffic to African colonies. The Northern
Territories gained access to European beer, wine, and spirits only in the 1950s. The peoples of
southern Gold Coast/Ghana form the focus of this study.
3 Nsa originally referred to palm wine (nsafufuo, tapped from oil palm and raffia pahn trees) but its
usage has been extended to ail types of alcohol, including European beer, wine, and spirits.
4 For a detailed discussion of nsa's spiritual potency, see Emmanuel Akyeampong, "Alcohol, Social
Conflict and the Struggle for Power in Ghana, 1919 to Recent Times" (Ph.D dissertation, University
of Virginia, 1993), chap. 2.
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involved the sharing of palm wine among assembled witnesses, the spiritual
quality of nsa binding these witnesses to uphold the validity of judicial
decisions and legal agreements in the absence of written documents.5 The
ritual importance of alcohol w~s, in fact, enshrined in a Twi proverb: Ade'a
ye de nsa ye no, yemmfa nsuo nye ("What nsa is used for, water cannot be
a substitute"). Since it was the repository of such potent spiritual power,
male eIders in gerontocratic Akan, Ga-Adangme, and Ewe societies sought
to monopolize the use of nsa. Nsa unlocked the door to the spiritual realm
where aIl human requests were granted. As Nana Nketsia V emphasized:
Nsa is a definite link between man and his ancestor because it is spiritual. The
ancestors are spiritual, and this [nsa] is a spirit.6
European rum, gin, and schnapps were incorporated into rituals in southem
Gold Coast, and male eIders excluded women and young men from using
alcoho1.7 In monopolizing the ritual use of alcohol, the eIders fused its
sacred power with secular power.
The close association between the male eIders' monopoly over alcohol
and their religious and political power led to the construction of an ideology
of conspicuous consumption among the powerfu1.8 To have access to
abundant palm wine and to use it in a wasteful manner highlighted the
wealth and power of the social elitesY The expansion of European com-
merce and wage-Iabour employment from the mid-nineteenth century
provided young men with the opportunity to eam cash. Young men migrated
to coastal towns, the foci of European economic activity, and an elaborate
pattern of social drinking emerged among them to express their new autono-
my from rural eIders and their new wealth. 1O Alcohol's significance ex~
panded to encompass religious, political, social, and economic power.
Financing the Gold Coast Colonial Government
The British colonial govemment in the Gold Coast regarded local demand
5 For discussions on the religio-cultural use of alcohol in Gold Coast, see, for example, the works of
Robert Sutherland Rattray: Ashanti (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1923), pp. 97-98; Religion and Art
in Ashanti (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1927), pp. 148-150; and Ashanti Law and Constitution
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1929), p. 53.
6 Interview with Nana Nketsia V, Paramount Chief of English Sekondi, March 6, 1992.
7 See Raymond Dumett, "The Social Impact of the European Liquor Trade on the Akan of Ghana
(Gold Coast and Asante), 1875-1910", Journal of Interdisciplinary History, vol. 5, no. 1 (1974),
pp. 69-101; Akyeampong, "Alcohol and Social Conflict in Ghana", pp. 67-68.
8 Conspicuous consumption is not equated with drunkenness.
9 See, for example, Thomas Edward Bowdich, Missionfrom Cape Coast Castle to Ashantee (1824;
London: Frank Cass, 1966), pp. 277 and 293.
10 Akyeampong, "Alcohol and Social Conflict in Ghana", chap. 3; Augustus Casely-Hayford, "Hermet-
ic Hegemony: A Study of Arcane Brotherhoods on the Gold Coast (1735-1935)" (African History
Seminar, School of Oriental and African Studies, 1989), p. 3.
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for alcohol for religious and cultural purposes as the solution to its quest for
financial self-sufficiency. Customs duties on imported alcohol came to play
a central role in the financing of the British colonial government and the
maintenance of British power. II British colonization of the Gold Coast was
a piecemeal process not marked by a definite military conquest (with the
exception of Asante) or by specifie treaties ceding sovereignty. The coast
was declared a colony in 1874 through Britain's protection of the coastal
states against Asante imperialism in the nineteenth century. The creeping
assumption of colonial power in the Gold Coast made taxation one of the
soUd manifestations of the 10ss of power and led to its politieization.
Prior to 1874, the informaI extension of British influence in the Gold
Coast had resulted in a de facto colonial situation. In 1850 the British
administration in the Gold Coast established the office of governor, as weIl
as legislative and executive councils. The Gold Coast received a parliamen-
tary subsidy of f4,000 per annum, but this was insufficient to meet adminis-
trative costS.12 Taxation was a tricky issue, for how could Britain tax a
people over whom it had no formaI jurisdiction? How could Britain justify
the tax and secure consensus about paying it? The British decided on two
solutions. First, a representative assembly of the people, constituted of their
chiefs, was created to pass the tax. Second, the British inserted in the tax
ordinance an explicit commitment to direct most of the tax receipts into
internaI development as justification. 13 Taxation, representation, and inter-
nai development were thus linked in the 1850s and would remain linked in
the African mind for the entire colonial period.
The attempt to levy a polI tax in the 1850s eventually failed because the
British neglected the concessions for internai development and refused to
pay the agreed stipends to the chiefs who assisted in the tax collection. The
British administration's need for finances was still crucial, and customs
duties were imposed in the second half of the nineteenth century. Increasing
imports of spirits quickly made alcohol duties one of the most important
constituents of the colonial government's finances. As a London official
commented in 1877, customs duties were ideal for imposing on a population
too ignorant to understand their workings. 14 Between 1883 and 1895, about
Il The Gold Coast was not an isolated case in West Africa. For colonial dependence on alcohol
revenues in Nigeria, see A. O1orunfemi, "The Liquor Traffic in British West Africa: The Southern
Nigerian Example, 1895-1918", International Journal ofAfrican Historical Studies, vol. \7, no. 2
(1984), pp. 220-242; and Ayodeji Olukoju, "Prohibition and Paternalism: The State and the
Clandestine Liquor Traffic in Northern Nigeria, c. 1898-1918", International Journal of African
Historical Studies, vol. 24, no. 2 (1991), pp. 349-368.
12 David Kimble, A Political History o.fGhana 1850-1928 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963), p. 169.
13 See, for detailed discussions, ibid., chap. 4; John Mensah Sarbah, Fanti National Constitution (1906;
London: Frank Cass, 1968), pp. 100-103; and J. E. Casely Hayford, Gold Coast Native Institutions
(London: Sweet and Maxwell, 1903), pp. 160-163.
14 Cited in Kimble, A Political History of Ghana, p. 308.
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Table 1 Contribution of Customs Duties Ineluding Liquor Revenues, and Railway
Revenues to Total Government Revenue, Gold Coast 1910-1913 (! sterling)
Import Liquor Railway Total % of Liquor
Year Duties Duties Revenues Revenue Contribution
1910
1911
1912
1913
610,602
663,071
735,470
779,593
384,538
421,970
470,144
502,429
248,981
294,650
329,399
357,329
1,006,633
1,111,632
1,230,850
1,301,566
38
38
38
39
Sources: Public Records Office (PRO), London, CO 554/41/19073; and Report of the
Commission of lnquiry Regarding the Consumption of Spirits in the Gold Coast
(London, 1931), Appendix 111.
nine million gallons of liquor were imported into the Gold Coast; it is
significant that Raymond Dumett argued that these imports at the tum of the
century "were absorbed into the traditional religio-cultural system".15
By the period immediately preceding World War I, liquor duties were
contributing almost 40 per cent of total govemment revenues in the Gold
Coast. Table 1 gives statistics for the two leading sources of govemment
revenue - customs duties and railway revenues - in the immediate pre-
World War l era. Wholesale and retail licences for spirits, wine, and beer
brought in a further B2,440 sterling in 1910, B8,786 in 1911, ;[42,362 in
1912, and ;[45,725 in 1913, or roughly 4 per cent of total revenue. 16 Huge
alcohol imports had been made possible by a growing indigenous cocoa
industry, and the Gold Coast emerged as the world's leading producer of
cocoa in 1911. By 1919 govemment officiaIs such as the comptroller of
customs were commenting on the close connection between increased cocoa
exports and increased alcohol imports. l ? The onset of railway construction
and mechanized mining, with the concomitant concentration of single male
migrants in colonial towns, encouraged social drinking among railway
workers and miners. 18 The prosperity that marked the Gold Coast in this
period also resulted in a general increase in the demand for consumer goods
other than alcohol, as indicated in Table 2.
15 Dumett, "The Social Impact of the European Liquor Trade", pp. 76, 84. By the 1880s, the Manches-
ter Chamber of Commerce was complaining that the Gold Coast colonial government was neglecting
British trade interests as taxes on Iiquor and tobacco were bringing in sufficient government
revenue. George Eider Metcalfe, Great Britain and Ghana: Documents of Ghana History, 1808-
1957 (London: Thomas Nelson, 1964), pp. 428---430.
16 1930 Commission Report, Appendix V, "Statement of amounts collected in respect of spirit, wine
and beer licences for the years 1909 - 1927-8".
17 Public Records Office, London (hereafter PRO), CO 96/597/15501.
18 The important place of alcohol in the social lives of railway workers is underscored in Richard
Jeffries, Class, Power and 1deology in Ghana: The Railwaymen ofSekondi (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1978). As early as 1910, northern migrants who returned from mine labour in the
south were reported to have "acquired bad drinking habits", as stated by Jeff Crisp, The Story of
an African Working Class: Ghanaian Miners' Struggles, 1870-1980 (London: Zed, 1984), p. 36.
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Table 2 Value (~) of Consumer Goods Imported into the Gold Coast, 1919-1923
Articles 1919 1920 1921* 1922 1923
Rice 126,074 357,149 93,471 109,068 141,832
Flour 169,339 232,786 159,088 138,312 198,595
Refined sugar 50,646 274,598 43,276 109,012 116,554
Cotton-
manufactures 1,889,192 3,645,776 892,977 1,120,376 144,344
Cigarettes 159,303 289,418 36,816 203,084 182,657
Gin 10,965 45,473 64,307 153,043 183,864
Rum 174,624 11,439 15,563 9,892 15,547
* Declining imports of consumer goods in 1921 reflected a major slump in the world market
price for cocoa at the end of 1920.
Source: Gold Coast, Blue Book, 1923-4.
However, from 1919 the St. Germain international convention on liquor,
which sought to reduce liquor traffic in the African colonies, increasingly
made it embarrassing for the British colonial government to depend on
liquor revenues in its African colonies. 19 Britain was also one of the lead-
ing advocates of this restrictive policy.20 The British temperance move-
ment, organized around churches in the metropolis and the colonies, was
jubilant, for they had long criticized official dependence on alcohol revenues
as a contradiction to Britain's custodianship of less-developed peoples. As
early as the l880s, the Native Races and Liquor Traffic United Committee
had emerged in Britain to champion prohibition in the colonies.
The colonial governments of the Gold Coast and Nigeria vigorously
protested the imperial policy to restrict liquor traffic, as it undercut their
financial bases.21 As a compromise solution, the St. Germain Convention
banned "trade spirits", and each colonial government was left to define what
these were. The Gold Coast government classified them as spirits imported
"for sale to natives, and not generally consumed by Europeans".22 The
Gold Coast drew up a list of trade spirits that heavily affected foreign
labels, including mm and Dutch gin or geneva.
The effect of banning geneva and mm soon proved contrary to the
financial interests of the Gold Coast government. Table 3 illustrates the
sharp drop in customs duties on imported spirits. Only imported mm, gin,
19 On international conventions regulating liquor traffic in the African colonies, see Lynn Pan, Alcohol
in Colonial Africa (Uppsala: Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1975). The st. Germain
Convention also declared illegal the commercial distillation of spirits in African colonies and
imposed a high Jax on imported alcohol. For the text of the convention, see Raymond Leslie Bueil,
The Native Problem in Africa, vol. 2 (New York: Macmillan, 1928), pp. 950-953.
20 Britain's support for restrictive liquor laws was linked to her imperial designs on the former German
colonies in Africa.
21 See PRO, CO 554/41/19073; and PRO, CO 554/41/10107.
22 Gold Coast, Government Gazette, July 24, 1920.
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Table 3 Contribution of Gin and Rum to the Total Customs Revenue from Spirits
Imports, Gold Coast 1913-1921
Total Spirits Duties
Gin and Rum
Imports Duties Gin Rum Duties as
Year (gal.) (f sterling) (f) (f) % of Total
1913 1,762,850 502,429 159,404 328,965 97.2
1914 1,722,611 494,460 150,985 327,344 96.7
1919 672,462 371,431 9,083 344,208 95.1
1920 179,597 141,018 37,607 14,439 36.9
1921 283,319 283,868 93,605 14,253 37.9
Source: Appendix III (1930 Commission Report); and PRO, CO 554/46121446.
.and schnapps had been incorporated into ritual in the southern Gold Coast,
and their elimination reduced African demand.23 Britain dominated the
trade in whisky, but that did not penetrate the African market in the Gold
Coast. Dutch gin was far cheaper than British gin, and three centuries of
Dutch-dominated liquor trade on the Gold Coast had popularized Dutch
labels over their British counterparts. In the face of a general decline in
akohol revenues, the colonial government decided to readmit Dutch
geneva.24 Imports of geneva soon soared.
The Gold Coast colonial government justified the revival of liquor reve-
nues by linking them to the need for internaI development, an argument
reminiscent of the early attempt to levy taxes in the 1850s. Governor
Frederick Gordon Guggisberg (1919-1927) had initiated a Ten-Year Devel-
opment Plan upon his arrivaI in the Gold Coast, setting ambitious goals for
socio-economic development:
This was to involve a total expenditure of f25 million; f2 million was ear-
marked for the construction of a harbour, fI4.5 million for railways, fI
million for roads, f1.9 million for water supplies, f1.9 million for town
improvements and drainage, f2 million for hydraulic and electric works, fI
million for public buildings including Achimota [college], f90,000 for post
and telegraphs, and f200,000 for maps and surveys.25
Apart from an externalloan of ;[4 million, Guggisberg financed this project
mostly from internaI sources - customs duties, of which spirits duties were
the leading contributor.
23 Akyeampong, "Alcohol and Social Conflict in Ghana", pp. 67---{j8, suggests reasons for this
phenomenon.
24 See PRO, CO 554177/4030, Colonial Office minute on "Gin and Geneva" by J. A. Calder, Septem-
ber 24, 1928.
25 Albert Adu Boahen, Ghana: Evolution and Change in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries
(London: Longman, 1975), p. 110.
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The Temperance Onslaught
With their expectations of taxation and internaI development being fulfilled,
Gold Coasters were relatively quiescent about Guggisberg's dependence on
liquor revenues. Guggisberg's successor, Alexander Ransford Slater
(1927-1932), however, reverted to the typical colonial economic policy
based on commerce and other extractive industries such as mining, with
little investment in socio-economic infrastructure.26 Reaction was instanta-
neous: Slater' s administration was severely criticized by African representa-
tives on the legislative council and the African press for its dependence on
liquor revenues.27
An indigenous, opposing definition of "development" was presented by
African representatives of the legislative council:
If the govemment are trustees for the good of the people of this country, if they
are to think of the welfare of the people of this country ... 1 am submitting
respectfully it is their charge to see that such things as the consumption of gin
and other things which go not only to impoverish the people but also to affect
their morals and physical health should be very seriously considered.28
African attacks on the government's liquor policy were subtly couched in
the alcohol discourse of the colonizer to avoid accusations of political
sabotage. Unlike the situation in the 1870s, when colonial officiaIs could
smugly comment on African ignorance about the general effects of customs
duties on the population, this group of Africans inc1uded sophisticated
businessmen and politicians who knew that the incidence of customs duties
had widespread economic effects and were versed in the art of lobbying.
The state's dependence on alcohol revenues would no longer go unques-
tioned by domestic opinion. In 1928 African legislative representatives
called for a commission of inquiry into the consumption of spirits in the
Gold Coast.29
The colonial government was faced with a dilemma: it could not ignore
the demands of the people's representatives in the legislature that something
be done about liquor imports, nor could it deny the central importance of
liquor revenues to government finances. An examination of the year 1929
reveals that the total revenue from import duties, the largest source of
government finance, amounted to f2,040,348 sterling, of which gin alone
contributed ;[734,286, or 36 per cent. The second-ranking import commodi-
26 Jonathan H. Frimpong Ansah, The Vampire State in.Africa: The Po/itical Economy of Decline in
Ghana (Trenton, N.J.: Africa World Press, 1992), pp. 59-65.
27 See Gold Coast, Legislative COllllcil Debates, March 1, 1928.
28 Statement of the Paramount Chief of Akyem Abuakwa, Nana Ofon Atta I. Gold Coast, Legislative
Council Debates, March 1, 1928.
29 PRO, CO 96/68116204, Slater's telegram to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, December 18,
1928.
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ty, tobacco, brought in f286,733 sterling (14 per cent). Cocoa export duties
fetched f277,746 sterling (13.6 per cent). AlI other exports, totalling the
remaining third, were individually insignificant. There were no excise duties
in the Gold Coast since no factories existed.30
Governor Slater made a final ineffective appeal to save gin revenues in
his address to the legislative council on February 15, 1929, couching his
appeal in the rhetoric of taxation and development that he had jettisoned in
practice. In his opinion, the decision to cut down drinking should be volun-
tary and not enforced by legislation:
If, however, that object was not obtained, or were only partially obtained, it
would still be incorrect to say that the native was being impoverished: he
wouId only be showing his willingness to pay a higher rate of taxation in
order to satisfy one of his desires, and so far from that taxation impoverishing
the people generally its proceeds would be repaid to them in the form of more
water supplies, medical and sanitary improvements and the like.31
The African representatives on the Legislative Council rejected the logic of
Slater' s argument because he had proved that he did not observe the claimed
connection between taxation and socio-economic development.
Governor Slater appointed a commission in March 1929 to examine
spirits consumption in the Gold Coast. Its second term of reference under-
scored the government' s concern with the threat to its finances:
(b) in the event of action being advisable which wouId be likely to result in
an appreciable loss of revenue, what means should be adopted to make good
that 10ss.32
The Commission submitted its report in 1930, recommending, inter alia,
that the importation of gin be gradually prohibited by means of a progres-
sive reduction in imports over a lO-year period and that the duties on aIl
spirits be increased. The Commission declared that the Gold Coast did not
have a liquor problem. Table 4 presents the per capita consumption of
spirits in the Gold Coast between 1900 and 1930 in relation to the respec-
tive figures for Britain during the same period.33 Figures for spirits con-
sumption in the Gold Coast were indeed declining, and it is clear that the
Gold Coast "Liquor Question" involved more than the issue of temperance.
30 Gold Coast, Blue Book, 1933-1934.
31 Gold Coast, Legislative Council Debates, February 15, 1929.
32 1930 Commission Report.
33 The increase in illicit distillation from the 1930s makes it impossible to give reHable per capita
consumption figures for spirits in post-1930 Gold Coast
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Table 4 Spirits Consumption in the Gold Coast and Britain, 1909-1929
Gold Coast (Imported) Britain (Home and Imported)
Year Gals. proof Per head Gals. proof Per head
1909 * * 31,063,000 0.70
1913 835,780 0.68 31,794,000 0.70
1928 484,600 0.26 12,067,000 0.27
1929 302,282 0.16 12,037,000 0.27
* Not available
Sources: Gold Coast, Report ofInquiry Regarding the Consumption ofSpirits, Appendix IX;
and G. P. Williams and G. P. Brake, Drink in Great Britain 1900 ta 1979 (Lon-
don: Edsall, 1980), p. 354.
The recommendations of the Commission represented a compromise
solution: graduaI prohibition of gin met the most insistent demand of the
African legislative representatives and gave the government time to find a
substitute source of revenue. The increase in duties was meant to stem
demand by raising the price of spirits. At this juncture, the colonial govern-
ment was still hopeful, for previous raises in tariffs had not deterred contin-
ued increases in spirits imports.
What the colonial government and the African legislative representatives
did not foresee was that high priees could stimulate illicit distillation, and
so akpeteshie (local gin) entered the scene.34 The increases in liquor duties
and illicit distillation coincided with the 1930s depression, and the decreased
purchasing power and the availability of cheap, local gin were soon reflected
in declining import figures. Gin imports dropped 91.4 per cent from 569,746
gallons in 1929 to 49,356 gallons in 1931 although the permitted quota was
512,280 gallons. In 1933 only 69,450 gallons were imported, only a sixth
(17.3 per cent) of an allowed quota of 398,440 gallons. The total revenue
collected from spirits licences dropped 82.4 per cent from f68,078 sterling
in 1928-1929 to fI 2, 118 in 1933-1934.35
The effect of the decline in spirits revenues on total government revenue
and expenditure was dramatic, as Table 5 illustrates for the period between
1927 and 1933. In a desperate searçh for revenue, the government approved
an application from a Swiss company, Overseas Breweries Limited, to
establish a beer factory in Accra, hoping that excise duties wouId ameliorate
the government's straitened finances.36 Beer production remained low
34 Akpeteshie is a potent, harsh-tasting, distilled palm liquor.
35 Govemor Shenton Thomas, Memorandum on Liquor PoUcy (Accra: Government Printer, 1934).
Copy in PRO, CO 961715121702.
36 See PRO, CO 961703/7242, and PRO, CO 9617 1III 933, for the origins of the Overseas Brewery
factory in Accra. The Gold Coast govemment's decision was no doubt aided by the growing
popularity of imported lager and stout after 1927. Overseas Breweries would be renamed Accra
Brewery Limited (ABL) after independence.
The State and Akohol Revenues 403
Table 5 Revenue and Expenditure of the Gold Coast, 1927-1933
Revenue Expenditure
Year (f sterling) (f sterling)
1927-28 4,121,522 3,618,382
1928-29 3,913,529 4,629,294
1929-30 3,397,324 3,932,022
1930-31 3,499,419 3,744,010
1931-32 2,284,299 2,823,752
1932-33 2,670,786 2,679,482
Source: Gold Coast, Annual Report, 1932-33, p. 80.
initially, however, with 112,666 cartons being produced in 1933-1934, the
first year of production.3? Ten years later, the half-million mark had still
not been reached.38 Income tax was introduced in 1934, in spite of popular
resistance, but it was sorne time before adequate records and statisties were
available to make collection effective. Spirits imports never recovered to
their pre-1929 figures.
From the 1930s, the colonial govemment' s revenues were increasingly
drawn from taxes on mineraIs (gold and diamonds) and cocoa. The British
govemment established a cocoa control board in the Gold Coast in 1939 to
protect British balance of payments during World War II. A reserve fund
was created and the British govemment retained a portion of the proceeds
from the sale of cocoa. The effectiveness of the control board led to the
establishment of a permanent Cocoa Marketing Board in 1947, ostensibly
to stabilize producer prices for Gold Coast cocoa farmers, but a huge gap
was deliberately maintained between the world market price and the local
priee paid to cocoa farmers. 39 For colonial and independent African gov-
emments, cocoa reserve funds would be utilized for development pro-
jects.40 AlI remained well as long as cocoa priees rose on the world mar-
ket. In the 1940s and most of the 1950s, cocoa priees continued to rise and
enough money trickled down to farmers to sustain their interest in cocoa
cultivation.
In February 1948, spontaneous riots broke out in Accra in protest of the
high cost of imported goods and cost of living, accelerating the process of
decolonization in the Gold Coast.41 The first general election in the country
37 A carton contains approximately 12 one-litre bottIes. The Gold Coast's population in 1931 was
3,163,568, and huge imports would he necessary if European beer was to compete effectively with
local akpeteshie.
38 Interview with Gideon Amenuvor, Brewery Manager, Accra Brewery Limited (formerly Overseas
Breweries Limited), February 19, 1992.
39 Douglas RÎlnmer, Staying Poor: Ghana's Political Economy, 1950-1990 (Oxford: Pergamon Press,
1992), pp. 200-205.
40 See Ansah, The Vampire State in Africa, chap. 7, for an analysis of the cocoa industry.
41 The 1948 riots were more than an economic outburst, although the cost of imported goods was the
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was held in February 1951, and the Convention People' s Party (CPP)
formed in 1949 by Kwame Nkrumah won 34 of the 38 popularly elected
seats. The Gold Coast became internally self-governing and Nkrumah was
styled "leader of government business". Till March 7, 1957, when indepen-
dence was granted to the Gold Coast, there was a period of diarchy in
which the CPP government co-existed with the colonial administration.
Independent Ghanaian Governments and the Alcohol Industry
Modernization theory was prevalent in economic circles in the 1950s and
1960s, and it was believed that newly independent countries only had to
industrialize their economies to transform themselves into modern states.
Nkrumah was a firm believer in the modern state, and in 1952 the CPP
government invited the famous West Indian economist, William Arthur
Lewis, to study the Gold Coast's potential for industrialization. Lewis
deflated the hopes of the CPP government to transform the Gold Coast into
a modern, industrialized state. He argued that economic conditions such as
the limited market in the Gold Coast did not justify a major program of
industrialization. He suggested that the government concentrate instead on
raising the productivity of agriculture and improving public services. In
Lewis's opinion, many years would elapse before it would become economi-
cal to give priority to manufacturing.42 Blinded by the pervasive bias
against agriculture in modernization theory, the CPP government chose to
neglect Lewis's advice.
The CPP government embarked on a major industrialization programme
financed by cocoa funds siphoned by the Cocoa Marketing Board. Declining
liquor imports devalued the previous relevance of this source of revenue to
infrastructural development. In the first development plan initiated by the
CPP government in 1951, 94 per cent, or E1I8.3 million out of the total
planned expenditure of E121.6 million, accrued from cocoa earnings.43
Central to the CPP' s effort was the reformed Industrial Development Corpo-
ration (IDC) first established by the colonial government in 1947. The IDC
was empowered to set up entirely new industries and to enter into partner-
ships with firms of proven business capacity and financial standing. In the
government' s haste to replicate a modern, industrialized state, ill-considered
manufacturing concerns, from a mango-processing plant to the Ghana Cigar
Company, were established. At the end of June 1961, the IDC wouId have
22 subsidiary companies and nine associated companies; only eight of the
precipitating factor, and the Commission of Enquiry set up to investigate the riots chronicled a wide
range of political, economic, and social grievances. See Colonial Office, Report of the Commission
of Enquiry into Disturbances in the Gold Coast, 1948 (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office,
1948).
42 See Rimmer, Staying Poor, p. 63.
43 Gold Coast, Economie Survey, 1955, pp. 1-2.
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22 subsidiaries would be shown to have made profits.44 A steep decline in
the world market price for cocoa from 1958 soon pushed the government
into financial difficulties, and from 1960 budget deficits became the norm.
Against the overall dismal performance of the manufacturing sector, the
performance of the local alcohol industry was outstanding.45 The success
of the alcohol industry stressed the contradiction of political independence
and continued economic dependence in Ghana. From 1954, the CPP govern-
ment invited foreign capital to invest in Ghana' s industrialization pro-
gramme. Expatriate firms chose sectors of the economy that had proven
profit records and established breweries and distilleries in Ghana in the
transition from alcohol imports to local production.46
From the late 1950s, the CPP government switched to distillery-led
industrialization. In 1958 a Liberian businessman, Leroy Francis, had
established the first large distillery in Ghana at Adutor, near Keta. The
factory also set up sugar cane plantations at Adutor from which it gained
crude alcohol.47 The CPP government, drawing insights from the profitabil-
ity of the alcohol industry, dec1ared in 1958 that government participation
would be mandatory in any venture to manufacture "alcoholic
beverages".48 A state-owned distillery, IDC Ghana Distilleries, was estab-
lished, and local distillation of akpeteshie was legalized to provide crude
alcohol for the distillery's production. The CPP government begun construc-
tion of two sugar factories at Akuse and Komenda, anticipating that their
by-product of molasses would feed the new state distillery.49
Expatriate capital strove to maintain a share of the lucrative Ghanaian
alcohol industry, however. A London firm, Duncan, Gilbey and Matheson,
succeeded in negotiating a contract to supply materials like concentrates to
44 Tony Killick, "Manufacturing and Construction", in Walter Birmingham, I. Neustadt, and E. N.
Omaboe, eds., A Study of Contemporary Ghana, vol. 1 (Evanston: Northwestem University Press,
1966), p. 274.
45 Ibid., pp. 282-283.
46 Josephine F. Milburn, British Business and Ghanaian Independence (London: C. Hurst, 1977), chap.
9, points out that British business was not interested in Ghana'sdevelopment projects. Interested
primarily in commercial profits, firms like John Holt (Liverpool) terminated most of their activities
in Ghana on independence. C. M. Rogerson and B. A. Tucker, in "Commercialization and Corporate
Capital in the Sorghum Beer Industry of Central Africa", Geoforum, vol. 16 (\985), pp. 357-368,
examine the central role of foreign capital in local alcohol industries.
47 Ghana, Report of the Committee Appointed to Enquire into the Manner of Operation of State
Distilleries Corporation (Accra, 1968), p. 5.
48 Moorland-Spingarn Research Center, Howard University, Dabu Gizenga Collection on Kwame
Nkrumah, Box 128---6, "Statement on lndustrial Promotion by Dr. Kwame Nkrumah, Prime Minister
of Ghana" in the National Assembly on September 3, 1958. The alcohol industry has featured
prominently in the attempts of African govemments to industrialize. See, for example, Susan Diduk,
"European Alcohol, History, and the State in Cameroon", African Studies Review, vol. 36, no. 1
(\993), pp. 1-42.
49 Ghana, Economie Survey, 1966, p. 67.
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Table 6 Comparative Priees of Coneentrates
Qty. Purchased
from D. G. & M*
Type of Coneentrate Since 1960
Campbell's Whisky 4,020 litres
Duncan's Whisky 24,491 litres
A.I Schnapps 40,000 litres
Schnapps (Henkes) 244,200 litres
Gilbey's Gin Il,728 litres
D. G. & M's*
Priees per
Litre (f.o.b.)
28s Od
28s Od
40s 2d
23s 9d
86s 9d
Max. Blenders'
Priees (f.o.b)
lOs Id
lOs Id
Ils 5d
7s Ild
4s 2d
* London firrn Duncan, Gilbey and Matheson
Source: Report on State Distilleries, p. 31. Under these terms, Ghana Distilleries was
overcharged by Duncan, Gilbey and Matheson to the tune of f324,827.
the state-owned distillery, thereby draining most of the profits from the
distillery between 1958 and 1965.50 As Table 6 illustrates, Duncan, Gilbey
and Matheson supplied concentrates to Ghana Distilleries at grossly inflated
prices. The CPP government' s unwillingness to scare away foreign capital
also enabled Heineken International of HOlland and the United African
Company to establish the Kumasi Brewery Limited. Its list of shareholders,
including the Commercial Society of West Africa, the French West African
Company, and the Union Trading Company (Switzerland) reflected the
determination of commercial capital to hoId onto former colonial markets.
The general performance of the Ghanaian economy continued to decline,
and the CPP government became increasingly arbitrary in its attempt to
eliminate political dissent,51 The grand hopes of economic prosperity held
at independence quickly faded, and individuals withdrew from the dictatorial
sphere of government politics in the pursuit of personal autonomy. Drinking
bars loomed large in the sociallife of Ghanaians, providing comfort, escape,
and a sense of "control". An acute drop in declining cocoa prices in
1965-1966 precipitated an economic crisis. The CPP government was
overthrown in a military coup in February 1966 organized by the National
Liberation Council. It is indicative of the growing importance of social
drinking that news of the coup was celebrated at drinking places:
By noon, the drinking bars, hotels and motels were packed to capacity with
jubilant young men and women in a mood of festivity. Never had so short an
announcement been accorded such a reception in Ghana.52
50 Report on State Distilleries, pp. 20-32.
51 In spite of the general economic decline, foreign capitalists were able to remit f:78,599,000 in profits
and interests from their lucrative investments in Ghana between 1957 and 1965. Kwesi Jonah,
"Imperialism, the State and the Indigenization of the Ghanaian Economy 1957-84", Africa Develop-
ment, vol. 10, no. 3 (1985), p. 95.
52 Boahen, Ghana, p. 222.
The State and Alcohol Revenues 407
However, the Ghanaian economy would continue to dec1ine, foreign invest-
ors wouId in general shy away, and more military coups wouId follow the
1966 example.
Under post-CPP governments, the alcohol industry continued to expand.
After a three-year tenure as a caretaker government, the National Liberation
Council handed over power to the civilian Progress Party government under
the leadership of Kofi Abrefa Busia. In spite of the Progress Party's overt
Western stance, the Ghanaian economy still failed to attract much foreign
investment. The alcohol industry did not suffer from lack of capital, how-
ever. A new Ghanaian-owned distillery, Paramount Distilleries Limited, was
established by Kwame Peprah outside Kumasi in 1969. In 1970 Paramount
Distilleries entered a partnership with a Swiss company, Vertrieb und
Verkauf-Aktiengesellschaft, in order to expand its operating capital.53 A
year later another international brewery, Arthur Guinness and Sons of
Dublin, Ireland, established a Guinness factory in Kumasi. Working c10sely
under the supervision of the mother company, the Kumasi factory produced
Guinness Foreign Extract Stout.
The anomalous situation of continued foreign domination of the Ghanaian
economy in a period of independence irked aspiring businessmen and
workers. Calls for economic nati,onalization had been insistent since the
appointment of African governments from the 1951 elections. However, the
persistence of official belief that development meant industrialization, which
would not be possible without foreign capital and technology, promoted
expatriate interests in the Ghanaian economy.54 This source of local resent-
ment became one of the pivoting factors in a January 1972 military coup led
by Colonel Ignatius Kutu Acheampong. The immediate cause was ostensibly
the devaluation of the Ghanaian cedi by 40 per cent at the end of 1971.55
The new National Redemption Council (NRC) government attempted to
renegotiate the competing interests of the state, local businessmen, workers,
and foreign capital. State assistance, in the form of loans and tax incentives,
was promised to Ghanaian businessmen who went into manufacturing. In
1973, a Ghanaian businessman, J. K. Siaw, established Tata Brewery
Limited, the first fully Ghanaian-owned brewery in the country. The
mid-1970s also witnessed the opening of a new private distillery in
Takoradi, Animens Distilleries, owned by a Ghanaian businesswoman, Anita
Mensah. The state then moved to break up the monopoly of the foreign
53 Interview with David Quartey, acting General Manager and Company Secretary, Paramount
Distilleries Limited, Tanoso, June 10, 1992. Bols International, a reputable firm distilling gin and
schnapps products popular along the West African coast, later replaced the Swiss firm.
54 On the thoroughness of foreign control of the Ghanaian economy, see Jonah, "Imperialism, the State
and the Indigenization of the Ghanaian Economy".
55 The Ghanaian pound replaced the pound sterling, in use from 1889, at par value on independence
in 1957. A new currency, the cedi, was introduced in 1965 at the rate of C2.4Û to the Ghanaian
pound. From 1986 the cedi was allowed to find its value on the market.
408 Histoire sociale / Social History
firms, acquiring 55 per cent of the shares in aIl foreign-owned mining and
timber firms between 1972 and 1975.
The NRC next passed an Investment Policy Decree in 1975 under which
foreign-owned concerns like the breweries were obliged to sell 40 per cent
of their shares to the state and 15 per cent to Ghanaian individuals. The
profit record of these firms, the excess liquidity in the economy around
1975, and an official policy that company shares should be broadly and
equitably distributed coincided to fragment the allotment of shares among
numerous applicants.56 The single largest private Ghanaian shareholder in
Accra Brewery Limited owned 9,200 out of a total of 12,000,000 shares or
0.08 per cent. In Guinness Ghana Limited, the largest Ghanaian shareholder
accounted for 200 shares out of a total of 712,000 (0.03 per cent).57 Private
company shares were sold privately, enabling these companies to pick
applicants from the professional elites who became an important political
and social asset for the companies.58
A change had occurred in the state's policy towards the alcohol industry
as the new military regime shifted from state-led industrialization to the
extraction of revenue from existing profitable industries. The government
appeared more interested in securing larger financial returns from breweries
than in controlling them, and the effective. management and control of these
companies remained under the original foreign owners. Indeed, indigeniza-
tion had benefited these foreign investors for they still retained control of
their companies, and the combination of foreign and local ownership pro-
tected them from possible nationalization by a future government.
After a brief revival, the economy resumed its decline. Official corruption
and the printing of currency made the situation worse, and the country came
graduaIly to a haIt. Inflation had increased from 3 per cent in 1970 to 116.5
per cent in 1977, and the country's credit lines were blocked by July 1979
because of an inability to pay past arrears.59 Another worrying index was
the growth in alcohol abuse mirrored by a new willingness to seek treatment
in the country's psychiatrie hospitals. This was a significant departure, for
the social stigma of mental illness had discouraged alcoholics from seeking
treatment at psychiatrie hospitals, the only available venues for treating
alcoholism. In fact, Accra Psychiatrie Hospital found the trend so unusual
that it began to compile statistics of alcohol-related cases from 1972. Medi-
cal practitioners drew attention to what was definitely becoming a social
problem.60
56 Jonah, "Imperialism, the State and the Indigenization of the Ghanaian Economy", pp. 83-84.
57 Kwame A. Ninsin, Political Struggles in Ghana 1967-1981 (Accra: Tornado Publishers, 1985), p.
46.
58 Jonah, "Imperialism, the State and the Indigenization of the Ghanaian Economy", p. 87.
59 Albert Adu Boahen, The Ghanaian Sphinx: Reflections on the Contemporary History of Ghana,
1972-1987 (Accra: Presbyterian Press, 1989), pp. 9-10.
60 C. C. Adomako, "Alcoholism: The African Scene", Annals of the New York Academy ofSciences,
vol. 273 (1976), pp. 39-46.
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The Acheampong junta was overthrown in 1979 by the lower ranks of the
Ghanaian army. The Armed Forces Revolutionary Council was established
under Flight Lieutenant John Jerry Rawlings, but it transferred power to
civilian rule under the People's National Party later that year. In its short
existence, the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council paradoxieally decided
to "nationalize" the only Ghanaian-owned Tata Brewery for supposed
irregularities in production. The brewery was renamed Achimota Breweries
Company Limited. The People's National Party government had a brief
tenure, as Rawlings returned to power in 1981 in another military coup. A
new Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) was set up to mIe the
country, adopting a populist, socialist-inclined political platform.
Probably because of its populist political ideology, the PNDC government
was open to representations from temperance interests complaining about the
social costs of a large, local alcohol industry. The PNDC government
banned television advertising on the part ofbreweries and distilleries. Severe
economie hardships compelled the PNDC government to abort its socialist
platform and adopt an Economie Recovery Programme in 1983 under the
auspices of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank.
In the new climate of economie liberalism, the breweries once again
became beneficiaries of state patronage. In 1985 the breweries petitioned the
newly-established National Revenue Secretariat to approach the government
about permitting beer advertisements on television.61 Like previous govern-
ments, the PNDC had come to appreciate the financial contribution of the
breweries to government .revenue. Beer commercials resurfaced, and the
breweries have been major beneficiaries of the Economie Recovery Pro-
gramme, securing huge loans to rehabilitate and expand their productive
capacities. Priees for beer and stout were dictated by the government and,
between October 1986 and March 1992, 13 successive increases in beer and
stout priees were instituted to alleviate government financial pressures.62
About 41 per cent of the priee of beer represented government taxes.63
A rejuvenated alcohol industry made significant financial contributions to
government revenue, although a general improvement in the economy
diversified the government's sources of revenue. The four breweries paid
excise duties and sales taxes constituting between 4 and 5.5 per cent of total
government revenue (Table 7). When these taxes are added to the state's
profit dividends as the majority shareholder in these breweries, to the returns
of astate distillery, and to excise duties, sales and income taxes from two
large private distilleries, 29 medium-scale blenders of spirits, 180 small-
61 Interview with Isaac Akesseh, Senior Research Officer, National Revenue Secretariat, Accra, June
30, 1992.
62 The author is grateful to Ohene Boakye, National Sales Manager of Accra Brewery Limited, for
compiling a chart of beer priees between 1986 and 1992.
63 Interview with Eric Baidoo, Brands Manager, Kumasi Brewery Limited, April 21, 1992.
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Table 7 Excise Duties and Sales Taxes Paid by Ghanaian Breweries, 1986-1990
(approximated figures in million cedis)
Year
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
(a)
Total Duties
and Taxes
4,002
5,448
7,400
9,174
11,668
(b)
Total Govemment
Revenue
73,625
116,046
153,791
174,522
267,347
% Contribution
of (a) to (b)
5.4
4.7
4.8
5.2
4.3
Sources: National Revenue Secretariat; Customs and Excise Preventive Service (Accra);
Guinness Ghana Limited and Kumasi Brewery Limited Annual Reports; Ghana,
The PNDC Budget Statement and Economie PoUcy for 1991 (Accra, 1991).
scale blenders, and local akpeteshie distillers, a better picture emerges of
alcohol's contribution to the state's coffers.64 The financial contribution of
the alcohol industry was such an acknowledged fact that even senior health
policy planners were reluctant to cali for an official policy on alcohol use.
Moreover, the tentacles of the alcohol industry reached far into the
Ghanaian economy. Beer and spirits production spawned an extensive
distribution network that covered the entire country: key distributors, whole-
salers, hotels, restaurants, and drinking bars. In just the town of Obuasi
(with a population of 67,399 in the 1984 census), there were 14 registered
hotels, 109 licensed drinking bars, and 174 registered akpeteshie retailers in
1991.65 The ramifications for employment and real estate are apparent.
Backward linkages of the alcohol industry included the sugar factories' by-
product of molasses, a product in high demand by the blenders; the Aboso
Bottle Factory, which manufactured the bottles for the breweries and distill-
eries; companies manufacturing tops for crowning the bottles; and printing
presses that printed the labels of the various brands of alcoholic drinks.
Forward linkages encompassed a wide transport network that serviced
distribution. The resources utilized by the alcohol industry and the employ-
ment its activities generated were definitely impressive.
Conclusion
Culturo-historical circumstances and rapid political, economic, and social
change have created a strong market for alcoholic drinks in Gold
Coast/Ghana. The underdeveloped nature of the economy limited sources of
government revenue, compelling colonial and post-colonial governments to
64 The statistics on local distilleries were provided in interviews with Robert Tandor, Officer in Charge
of Industries (Ministry of lndustry, Science, and Technology), Accra, July 27, 1992, and Albert
Prempeh, General Secretary of Ghana Cooperative Distillers Association, Accra, Ju\y 29, 1992.
There were 120,000 registered akpeteshie distillers in 199 J.
65 Records of Adimsi West District Council.
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exploit financially the demand for alcohol. In the country's bid to industrial-
ize, the alcohol industry has played a pioneering role.
A contradiction exists between the sober ideology the Ghanaian state
espouses and its dependence on alcohol revenues.66 In the "International
Day Against Drugs" in 1992, the Graphie caITied two pictures: one of the
Head of State (Chairman Rawlings) delivering a speech at the launching
ceremony; the other of the audience portraying a huge placard with the
message "Alcohol dampens your reasoning ability, stop it.,,67 In the previ-
ous week, however, the Ghanaian Chronicle reported that the government
had received 3.6 billion cedis from Kumasi Brewery Limited in taxes.68
For Ghanaian governments, the alcohol dilemma has been tentatively
resolved by the hope that oft-cited alcohol-related problems would not reach
a level that would render alcohol revenues uneconomical.
Temperance activists like Reverend Colonel Kofi Asare contend that the
social costs of alcohol abuse have already outstripped the financial rewards
from the alcohol industry.69 The desirability of a brewery/distillery-led
industrialization needs to be seriously re-evaluated. It is disheartening that,
in Ghana' s CUITent economic recovery programme, International Finance
Company, a World Bank subsidiary, would acquire II per cent of the shares
in the Achimota Breweries Company Limited.70 In the trimming of expec-
tations that has followed the failure of independent African countries to
industrialize after the 1960s, the very nature of development has come under
much discussion. There is a growing consensus in African countries in
support of people-centred development policies, and, however profitable the
alcohol industry might be, it does not fit into such a programme.
66 For a paraIIel example, see Alan Haworth, M. Mwanalushi, and D. M. Todd, "Community Response
to Alcoho1-Related Problems in Zambia" (Lusaka: University of Zambia, 1981).
67 The Graphie, June 27, 1992.
68 Ghanaian Chronicle, June 15-21, 1992.
69 Interview with Rev. Col. Kofi Asare, Head of Blue Cross Society (Ghana), Accra, June 30, 1992.
70 The Mirror, June 13, 1992.
